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Article 6

REACTION TO CLARK ON REGULATION
HAROLD A. COHEN*
It is useful to restate Professor Clark's theme in two parts. Clark
posits that society as a whole, and the legal system in particular, does
not know how to respond to matters regarding physicians - that the
legal system gives undue deference to the medical profession. Clark
suggests that because of this deference, health care regulation fails. He
then makes some suggestions for changing the way society treats the
medical profession.
This essay, while considerably shorter, has three sections. In the
first section, I support Clark's position regarding legal deference to the
medical profession by reference to the regulatory experience that Maryland's hospital rate setting commission has had with physicians. The
second section evaluates Clark's conclusion and posits an alternative
reason why health care regulation fails. The third section makes some
suggestions which, hopefully, follow from the first two sections.
I.

COURT EXPERIENCES REGARDING "PHYSICIAN REGULATION"

Maryland's hospital rate setting agency, the Health Services Cost
Review Commission (HSCRC) was created in 1971 and began reviewing rates in 1974. The first rates were set in February, 1975. Since
then, there have been some 375 separate rate cases docketed before the
Commission and hundreds of non-contested inflation adjustment orders issued by the Commission. During that time only four Commission rate orders have been subjected to judicial hearings. One of those
cases, HarfordMemorialHospital v. Health Services Cost Review Commission,' related not to the total cost or total revenue approved by the
Commission (the rate level), but to the Commission's determinations
regarding how that revenue should be charged (the rate structure).
This case is relevant to the subject of this paper only in demonstrating
that the hospital did not challenge the Commission's findings regarding
the most reasonable level for the hospital's aggregate rates or aggregate
costs.
Thus, only three rate orders have produced judicial decisions regarding cases in which the hospital has challenged the Commission's
* Executive Director, Health Services Cost Review Commission; Lecturer, Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene & Public Health.
1. 44 Md. App. 489, 410 A.2d 22 (1980).
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findings as to the appropriate level of aggregate cost and aggregate revenue. All three of those cases involved physician expenditures and the
associated rates. Moreover, while hospitals' annual filings with the
Commission have reported that physician expenditures comprise only
about six percent of all hospital costs in Maryland, these were the sole
expenditures at issue in all three cases.
The first case involved Baltimore County General Hospital, an approximately 200 bed hospital in a Baltimore suburb.2 The case was one
of four initiated by the Commission on July 1, 1974 when its review
authority became effective. Earlier in 1974, the Board of Medical Examiners' ruled that preceptors, foreign trained, unlicensed physicians,
could not be employed as house staff by Maryland's hospitals. Baltimore County General Hospital, therefore, negotiated new coverage
contracts with licensed physicians at an increased cost of about
$500,000. The Commission held a hearing to determine the appropriateness of that increase.
Prior to the hearing, the Commission's staff had found three expert
witnesses who were willing to testify. These witnesses included: a Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene physician who was
going to testify that Blue Shield already paid for the services to be provided by the hospital - and, thus, that Blue Cross would be paying
twice for the same services; a nationally recognized expert on nursing
service and nursing education who was going to testify that nurse practitioners were available and could perform the services called for in the
physician contracts for much less money; and, the head of the manpower section of the State's Comprehensive Health Planning Agency
who was going to testify that the physicians involved were needed
much more in parts of the community having no physicians than in
Baltimore County General where hospital rules already required each
patient to have a private attending physician. In each case, the wouldbe witness had been instructed by his/her boss not to testify.
The Commission's staff was left with no expert witnesses other
than the Commission's rate analyst. The hospital brought forward several physicians. The examination of these witnesses clearly demonstrated that the hospital did not know how much work was to be
2. Baltimore County Gen. Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, No. 5655 (Md.
Cir. Ct., Balto. County, Oct. 8, 1975).
3. The Maryland Legislature created the Board of Medical Examiners and granted it
monopoly power to act in those areas for which it was given statutory responsibility. See
MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 120-21 (1980). Professor Clark also discussed grants of power
to boards such as these. See Clark, Why Does Health CareRegulation Fail?.41 MD. L. REV.
1 (1981).
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performed under the contract. The Commission found that the staff's
recommended amount (approximately the old amount plus inflation)
was appropriate. The court, however, found for the hospital, stating
that the Commission's staff did not prove its case.4 Perhaps the most
interesting aspect of this case is that after the circuit court ruled and
before the Commission determined whether to appeal, the hospital's
board voted to renegotiate its physician contracts and to accept essentially the staffs recommendation. The Commission's staff had proven
its case to the hospital board even though it had not convinced the
court.
The second case regarding physician incomes involved Holy Cross
Hospital - an approximately 300 bed hospital in the Maryland suburbs of Washington, D.C.5 At the time this review began in 1976, the
contracts between the hospital and its radiologists and pathologists
called for the hospital to perform all billing. The patient's bills would
show one consolidated amount for physician and hospital services.
The separately negotiated "physician component" appeared in the hospital's books of account and audited financial records as a cost and as
an expenditure. The contracts called for the hospital to provide the
physicians with eighty-five percent of the gross billings for their services. The hospital kept the remaining fifteen percent for billing expenses, bad debts, etc.6
The Commission's staff presented testimony reflecting the cost per
relative value unit for the "professional component" in a large number
of Maryland hospitals. The hospital argued that its other costs were
low because of the excellent work of its radiologists and pathologists.
The radiologists also claimed the Commission had no jurisdiction because the contract had been changed so that they now billed directly.
The circuit court found that the Commission had jurisdiction; however,
the court remanded the case to the Commission to consider the incomes
of physicians in all of metropolitan Washington, D.C. The reader is
asked to ponder whether any judge would tell a Public Service Commission that, in deciding what rate to approve for a state or community's pay phones, it should consider how much was charged in an
unregulated neighboring state or community. Presumably, if unregulated rates were thought to be reasonable, regulation would not have
4. Baltimore County Gen. Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, No. 5655, slip
op. at 6-7 (dictum) (Md. Cir. Ct., Balto. County, Oct. 8, 1975).
5. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, No. 46598 (Md. Cir.
Ct., Montgomery County, Dec. 7, 1977).
6. This hospital, in one of the country's most wealthy communities, has a three to four
percent bad debt experience, but much of that is generated by the emergency room.
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been enacted. The Commission never heard the case on remand because the Court of Appeals eventually held that the Commission has no
jurisidiction to review physician contracts unless the physicians are salaried hospital employees.7 As the dissent in Health Services Cost Review Commission v. Holy Cross Hospital,Inc. 8 pointed out, this Act has
a broad remedial purpose and should be liberally construed; however,
the majority used a rigid and formalistic approach to impose a narrow
construction that completely subverts the purpose of regulation.9 Because the physician can make certain that his contract with the hospital
does not characterize him as a salaried employee, he can effectively
avoid any regulation.
The third case involved a request from Dorchester General Hospital to increase its anesthesia rate so that it could hire a second anesthesiologist."0 About 50,000 minutes of anesthesia are administered per
year at the hospital. At all but two or three Maryland hospitals, anesthesiologists bill on a fee-for-service basis. The Commission's staff
showed that the cost per minute requested was far beyond the amount
approved, and realized, at these other hospitals. Further, the staff
showed that the amount of work was not sufficient to justify even one
full-time anesthesiologist and that the hospital also had two nurse anesthetists. The hospital claimed that it was rural, that rural people are
entitled to anesthesiologists' services and that one anesthesiologist
would not work there and be on call without a second anesthesiologist.
7. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n v. Holy Cross Hosp., Inc., No. 43 (Md. Apr. 23,
1981). Radiologists and pathologists have three principal means of contracting with hospitals. The least prevalent method is a standard employee relationship. The most prevalent
method for pathologists is an agency relationship whereby the physicians are identified as
independent contractors and the hospital pays according to a piece of work or according to a
percentage arrangement. At the time the Commission's enabling act was passed, this agency
relationship was also most prevalent for radiologists. All pathologists, and over 80% of radiology revenue, were governed by one of these two arrangements at the time the Commission
was established. The third type, which has not become quantitatively significant for pathologists, but which has achieved almost 50% status for radiology, is a fee-for-service arrangement. At the time Holy Cross began, the Commission exercised jurisdiction over type one
and type two, but not type three. During the case, the radiologists shifted from type two to
type three. The circuit court originally held that the Commission regulates all three. After
several years, two appearances before the Court of Appeals, an evidentiary proceeding
before the circuit court, and various errors by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals, the final
decision was that the Commission only has jurisdiction when the physician is a salaried
employee of the hospital (type one). The Court of Appeals found that the Commission
never had jurisdiction at Holy Cross Hospital despite the facts stated above regarding the
situation at the time of the Commission's hearing.
8. No. 43 (Md. Apr. 23, 1981).
9. Id., slip op. at 9-10 (Davidson, J., dissenting).
10. Dorchester Gen. Hosp. v. Health Servs. Cost Review Comm'n, No. 4348 (Md. Cir.
Ct., Dorchester County, Dec 11, 1980).
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Further, the hospital showed that it took over $100,000 to entice an
anesthesiologist to live in the rural Eastern Shore of Maryland. The
Commission determined a reasonable rate for the professional service
based upon the costs and charges at the other hospitals. More was approved to allow for one full-time anesthesiologist. The court accepted
the hospital's argument in toto. The Commission was directed to issue
an order including over $200,000 for two anesthesiologists even though
the fee-for-service market would not have supported even one.
The courts have implied in all the above cases, but especially in
Holy Cross, that physicians can choose when they want to be subject to
Commission jurisdiction. They can opt out whenever they can get
more in the market place and opt in whenever the market place will not
provide them what they can get out of the hospital's board. Indeed, a
contract entered into the record in a current administrative hearing
before the Commission states that the physician can terminate the contract if he does not accept the Commission's decision.
The Commission has concluded, as has Clark, that regulation of
physician incomes simply does not work. On July 1, 1981 the Commission's Chairman issued a statement that says in part:
The Commission has had a great deal of experience in attempting to regulate physician services. All of them have proven
unsuccessful. That is not to say that all of the rates we have approved for physician services are unreasonable. Several are reasonable, but they are reasonable entirely because of the leadership
of the hospital board at the particular hospital which secured the
cooperation or acquiescence of the physicians involved. The
Commission has found that any attempt to exercise its authority
without board leadership has failed. But regulation which only
works when it ratifies others [sic] decisions is a wasteful exercise.
We have been uniformly denied the ability to apply our judgment
of reasonableness. The recent Holy Cross III decision makes it
even clearer that we can not possibly successfully regulate physician costs in the public interest. Any time the Commission approves a physician's ability to earn income at a level below that set
in the market place, the physician is totally free to avoid that decision. At the same time, physicians - or hospitals on their behalf
- can come to the Commission seeking to get more income than is
available in the market place - a market place very heavily
weighted toward high physician incomes already. The decision in
the Commission's recent Dorchester case shows how physicians
are likely to be successful in such attempts.
Holy Cross III only spoke to radiologists, pathologists and
cardiologists. It did not directly address other physician costs or
services. The Commission, however, has consistently stated its be-
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lief that the relationship of hospitals to radiologists and pathologists is much closer than the relationship of hospitals to other
physicians. Indeed, in most other specialties we would not even
suggest that the hospital, as opposed to the physicians, are offering
the services or that the costs are hospital and not physician costs.
We, therefore, believe it is inappropriate to deregulate physician
services in radiology, pathlogy and cardiology without deregulating all physician patient services. We have repeatedly identified
Medical Staff administration as a cost of hospital administrative
service and residents and interns as a cost of a hospital educational
service. We do not believe Holy Cross III calls for deregulation of
these costs which we continue to believe are hospital costs.
The Commission has concluded that if it continues to futilely
spend its scarce resources in this area, it will not be able to respond
successfully to the Medicaid challenge. While the Commission
can not assure the public that charges are reasonable, we urge insurers to not simply pay these uncontrolled charges, but to act so
as to assure that they are paying reasonable amounts on their subscribers [sic] behalf. We call upon the Insurance Commissioner to
insist upon such behavior and the Attorney General's office to attack monopolistic practices."
Clark's contention that we do not know how to limit physician's
market power through the legal system is correct. But why doesn't the
market itself sufficiently limit their ability to increase the amount of
resources devoted to health care?
II.

THE UNDERLYING PROBLEM IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

The peculiar role of physicians is not the underlying problem in
the health care industry; the basic problem is a market structure that
masks opportunity cost. Society's deference to physicians certainly is
important. Clark notes that society does not know how to relate to any
professional group. Yet being a Ph.D. in economics does not assure
one affluence; being a Ph.D. in history does not even assure comfort.
Most lawyers do not make what any physician can make. But the underlying problem goes beyond professionalism. In the health care market, individuals can act as if they do not forego anything else when they
consume more hospital or physician services. By socializing the payment for care, as opposed to the provision of care, the health care providers meet relatively little opposition from the insured, tax-supported
payor. Because physicians are paid separately from hospitals, they
11. Statement by David P. Scheffenacker, Chairman of Health Services Cost Review
Commission, 3-5 (July 1, 1981).
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earn no less money - but earn more or earn it more easily - by making hospitals more costly. The Baltimore County General Hospital
case exemplifies this phenomenon. Thus, regulation of hospitals can
neither stop consumers from demanding what they do not pay for as
individuals nor can it stop physicians from practicing medicine in ways
which make separately funded hospitals more costly.
III.

SOME SUGGESTIONS

The reader might be surprised that someone who is "a regulator"
is not supportive of regulation as a long run solution. I believe we have
probably caused net harm to society by licensing physicians. Physicians are lobbying very strongly against the removal of "freedom-ofchoice" from Medicaid programs. But "freedom-of-choice" is the freedom to choose any physician or hospital. Why not extend freedom-ofchoice beyond physicians? If we continue to give physicians monopoly
power, must we give it to them free? Why not at least require them to
provide care for the patients for whom the state has assumed fiscal responsibility? Instead we give physicians monopoly power and extract
nothing in return. The state must still obtain medical care for those it
supports, often from physicians who are unwilling to participate in
Medicaid programs. In our present system, physicians have the right to
treat only those willing to pay their fees; but, if this is to be the case, we
should revoke their monopoly power and allow non-physicians to provide medical care.
We should change the structure of physician fees so that physicians earn more by not hospitalizing patients, and by relying more
upon professional judgment and time rather than performing ever
more procedures.' 2 We should also move toward systems that make
physicians financially responsible for the decisions they make in their
role as the major resource managers in hospitals. 3
Perhaps the most complete solution would be to make consumers,
or their elected representatives, choose between health expenditures
and other expenditures as if the opportunity costs were real. We might
attain this goal by changing the tax laws to create a competitive market
12. See M. Blumberg, Physician Fees as Incentives, presented at Twenty-First Annual
Symposium on Hospital Affairs, Changingthe Behavior of the Physician,'A Management Perspective, Chicago, 11. (June 1-2, 1979). Mr. Blumberg suggests that buyers and providers
should negotiate prices for medical services. This would assist in equalizing rates charged
by internists, whose office fees are too low, and surgeons, whose operating fees are too high
when compared with their fees for important non-surgical care.
13. See M. Redisch, Hospital Inflationary Mechanisms, presented at Western Economic
Association Meetings, Las Vegas, Nev. (June 10-12, 1974).
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and by using block grants in which medical needs would have to compete with non-medical needs. These suggestions may be seen as very
threatening to our current system in which we seem to fund most perceived "wants" in medical care, although we do not fund them in any
other sector. 4 Who knows, the poor may rather have decent living
conditions while they are healthy and do with a little less when they are
sick (and perhaps they would be sick less often). Maybe the middle
class would rather have smaller classes in their children's schools than
have all private rooms in their hospitals. Maybe the wealthy would
support more modem heavy industry rather than more modem (tax
free) hospital plants.
It would be interesting to find out what decisions Americans
would make if our tax and licensing laws did not come between them
and their own personal judgment. Courts would not have opportunities to second guess our individual (as opposed to our bureaucratic)
decisions involving personal balancing of benefits and costs. Therefore, we would not be overly burdened by the deference the courts give
physicians.
14. See Lewis, CaliforniaMay DeregulatePhysicians, Am. Med. News, July 10, 1981, at
1,col. 3; Mr. Gephardt'sBill, Am. Med. News, Apr. 24, 1981, at 4, col. 1.

